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1. Introduction  
Concerns about environmental degradation due to climate change and dwindling reserves of 
fossil fuels generated an ongoing debate about efficient and effective ways to save energy. 
In addition to putting a price tag on emissions from burning fossil fuels and promoting renew-
able energies, enhancing energy end-use efficiency of durables is a major policy goal in e.g. 
the European Union (EU 2006, EU 2009), several states in the USA (EPA 2006) and Japan 
(METI 2010). Besides building codes, efficiency standards concerning the specific energy 
consumption1 of household durables are widely used. There are (at least) three reasons 
leading to the presumption that the specific energy consumption of such durables is too high 
from the viewpoint of the social optimum (for a more throughout discussion of this topic see, 
e.g., Schipper and Hawk 1991):  
1) Energy prices may be too low compared to the social optimum due to negative externali-
ties. 
2) Consumers may be subject to information asymmetries concerning the specific energy 
consumption of the durables. 
3) Consumers may behave myopic when deciding which appliance to purchase. This might 
lead to unduly high discount rates or even full neglect of the energy costs accruing over 
the useful life of a durable.2  
Of course, the first two reasons do not necessarily require the introduction of standards for 
energy efficiency since external costs can be captured by an emission tax and information 
asymmetries may be corrected with the help of labeling obligations.3 However, myopic be-
havior by consumers might not be adequately met with those policies. Consequently, energy 
efficiency standards are an appropriate instrument in the policy maker’s toolbox for enhanc-
ing energy end-use efficiency. 
An advancement of this policy approach are dynamic energy efficiency standards which in-
corporate the actual levels of the durables’ energy efficiency. Such dynamic standards tight-
en the mandatory efficiency level over time based on a benchmarking approach by determin-
ing a feasible or the most efficient appliance in each line of product per period. Next the regu-
lator sets this efficiency level for all producers. 
                                                 
1 The term “specific energy consumption” refers to the energy consumption per unit of service.   
2 For example, from purchasing patterns for a standard and an energy-efficient refrigerator, Meier 
and Whittier have estimated the following distribution of implied consumer discount rates: “Roughly 
2/5 of the consumers behaved as if they had real discount rates above 60 %, 1/5 between 35 and 
60 %, and 2/5 less than 35 %” (Meier and Whittier, 1983, p. 957). 
3 Concerning the impact of eco-labelling on consumer behaviour see, e.g., Sammer and Wüsten-
hagen (2006). 
 2 
An example for such dynamic standards is the European Ecodesign Directive (EU 2005, EU 
2009). Although it offers the possibility of voluntary agreements by industry it also enables 
mandatory energy efficiency targets accompanied by product labeling obligations. These 
targets are revised in regular intervals and may therefore be subject to continuous tightening. 
However, a more prominent example for dynamic energy efficiency standards is the Japa-
nese Top Runner Program which started in 1998 with 9 products and by 2012 covers 23 
products (Osamu 2012). The core of the Top Runner Program is that it obliges producers to 
establish the currently highest efficiency level for the respective durable by a certain target 
year. Although this policy approach is considered to have performed well,4 a dynamic stand-
ard for energy efficiency gives rise to strategic decision making. Especially a producer of high 
efficiency durables can influence the future standard by his efficiency choice today. This in-
centive might therefore affect environment and energy related policy goals counterproduc-
tively, if the high efficiency producer chooses to understate his actual capabilities. Examples 
from products regulated by the Japanese Top Runner Program like fluorescent lighting and 
liquid crystalline show that the efficiency targets were met much earlier than required by the 
program (Osamu 2012). This observation supports the presumption that dynamic standards 
for energy efficiency may prompt producers to refrain from implementing the actual potential 
for efficiency improvements. 
To the best of our knowledge, the economic incentives caused by dynamic standards for 
energy efficiency as described above have not been considered in the literature so far. How-
ever, our work is closely related to the literature on the effects of a minimum quality standard 
(MQS) because energy efficiency can be interpreted as a special type of quality. The respec-
tive literature traces back to the seminal papers of Leland (1979) and Shaphiro (1983) who 
demonstrate that an MQS can increase welfare in the case of asymmetric information about 
product quality when firms have no market power. Ronnen (1991) was the first to analyze the 
welfare effects of an MQS using a standard set up of vertically differentiated duopoly. In his 
model, the demand side is given by a continuum of consumers who are differentiated by the 
value that they place on quality. The supply side is described by two identical firms each of-
fering one single quality, where costs only consist of quality dependent fixed costs. Assuming 
quality competition on the first and Bertrand competition on the second stage, Ronnen shows 
that introducing an appropriately chosen MQS can increase welfare even in the absence of 
information asymmetries. The reason is that the positive effect on consumers’ surplus, which 
                                                 
4 See Nordqvist (2006) and Osamu (2012). Moreover, the Japanese Top Runner Programme has 
been celebrated by political scientists to be “the most advanced and sophisticated approach to ‘eco-
logical modernisation’” (Jänicke, 2006, p. 17). 
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is caused by limiting product differentiation and intensifying price competition, dominates the 
negative effect on the firms’ profits. Subsequently, the approach of Ronnen (1991) has been 
modified and extended in several ways. For example, Crampes and Hollander (1995) intro-
duce unit costs that increase in quality and Valetti (2000) considers the case of Cournot in-
stead of Bertrand competition in the second stage of the game. Both papers show that 
Ronnen’s optimistic results concerning the welfare effects of an MQS can not always be sus-
tained and depend on the set up of the model.  
Moreover, since the mid nineties, the issues dealt with in the literature on minimum quality 
standards have become increasingly diversified. For example, Häckner (1994), Ecchia and 
Lambertini (1997) as well as Napel and Oldehaver (2011) analyze the impact of minimum 
quality standards on the incentives for collusion; Lehmann-Grube (1997) and Kuhn (2006) 
assess the advantages and disadvantages to be the high or the low quality firm, respectively; 
Maxwell (1998), Puller (2006) and Garella (2006) evaluate the effects on the incentive to in-
novate; Boom (1995) and Lutz and Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) consider the role of minimum 
quality standards in international trade models; Lee and Phuyal (2013) study strategic entry 
deterrence by an incumbent under a MQS regime; and Cellini and Lamantia (2013) analyze 
the joint effects of minimum quality standards and price regulations within a dynamic frame-
work.  
In contrast to the more recent literature cited above we are not concerned with advanced 
topics like, e.g., collusion or the incentive to innovate. Instead, our work is in the spirit of the 
earlier contributions to the literature as we explore the more fundamental question whether or 
not a dynamic standard according to the Japanese Top Runner Program is an appropriate 
instrument at all when the regulator aims at increasing energy efficiency or total welfare. The 
remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and in 
Section 3, we calculate the unregulated equilibrium as our reference case. In Section 4, we 
derive the regulated equilibrium and in Section 5, we compare our results concerning energy 
consumption and welfare obtained for the regulated case with those for the unregulated one. 
Finally, in Section 6, we summarize our main conclusions and identify some topics for future 
research.  
2. The Model 
We employ a modified dynamic version of the model on MQS in differentiated duopoly pre-
sented by Crampes and Hollander (1995). The time horizon comprises two periods t=1,2, 
where the length of each period equals the useful life of the durables under consideration. 
There are two firms j=H,L each producing a single variant differentiated by the energy con-
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sumption εjt>0 which is calculated over the durables’ complete useful life.5 In line with the 
literature and without loss in generality we assume εLt>εHt,6 i.e., the role of each firm as high- 
or low-efficiency producer, respectively, is considered as given. The price of variant j in peri-
od t is denoted by pjt. 
The demand side is given by a unit mass of consumers indexed by i, each buying exactly 
one unit per period (this assumption will be discussed in Section 6). When deciding which 
variant to buy, the consumers compare the sum of purchase price pjt and perceived energy 
costs. The latter are given by jti w  , where w indicates the energy price and αi, which is 
distributed uniformly on the interval [a,b] with 1a0   and a1b  , is the individual weight 
assigned to energy costs by consumer i. Interpreting the different values of i  is straightfor-
ward: A consumer with 1i   can be characterized as “myopic” since he underestimates 
future energy costs, whereas a consumer with 1i   can be characterized as “green” since 
he accounts not only for total energy costs but also for environmental damage costs caused 
by energy consumption. Solving the equation LtiLtHtiHt wpwp   for αi yields the 
position of the indifferent consumer in period t: )](w/[]pp[ˆ HtLtLtHtt  .   
As mentioned above, our approach is closely related to the literature on minimum quality 
standards. However, quality is a positive characteristic, whereas energy consumption is a 
negative one. In order to ensure comparability of our results with the literature on MQS, we 
transform energy consumption εjt into the positive characteristic “energy efficiency” ejt using 
the definition 0ee jtjt max  .7 With this transformation, the position of the indifferent con-
sumer can be re-written as: 
]ee[w
ppˆ
LtHt
LtHt
t


 . (1) 
Consequently, in period t, all consumers with ti ˆ  choose variant L, whereas all consum-
ers with ti ˆ  choose variant H. The resulting market shares in period t are aˆs tLt   for 
firm L and tHt ˆ1as   for firm H. Moreover, from jtjt maxee   and εLt > εHt we obtain  
eLt < eHt, i.e., L is the low efficiency supplier and H is the high efficiency supplier. Both firms 
share the same technology, and production costs per unit are assumed to be independent of 
                                                 
5 This way of modelling energy consumption implies that all consumers apply the same rate of utiliza-
tion (for example, four washes per week in the case of a washing machine).  
6 The case εLt=εHt can be ruled out a priori because Bertrand competition would eliminate all profits.  
7 The term emax is an arbitrarily chosen but sufficiently large constant which cancels out in all of our 
calculations.  
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quantity but increasing in energy efficiency.8 In line with several other studies on MQS in dif-
ferentiated duopoly (e.g., Motta 1993, Ecchia and Lambertini 1997, Napel and Oldehaver 
2011) we use a quadratic unit cost function 2jtjt e)e(c   with 0 . 
In both periods, firms compete in two stages: In stage one, firms choose the level of energy 
efficieny ejt,9 and in stage two they simultaneously choose prices pjt. Finally, the regulation 
constitutes the link between the two periods: In period t=1 there is no regulation, whereas in 
period t=2 a minimum standard concerning energy efficiency denoted by e  is introduced. In 
line with the Japanese Top Runner Program we assume that e  is fixed according to the en-
ergy efficiency chosen by the high efficiency firm in period t=1: 1Hee  . Consequently, in 
period t=2 the firms have to comply with the restriction 1H2j ee  . The solution concept we 
employ is subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e., we solve the model backwards.  
3. Unregulated Equilibrium10 
Without regulation, there is no link between the two periods, and the equilibria in both periods 
will be identical. Hence, it suffices to calculate the equilibrium for a representative period t.11 
In the price game in the second stage, energy efficiency ejt is already fixed, and the firms’ 
profits are given by ]ep[s 2jtjtjtjt  . Inserting aˆs tLt   as well as tHt ˆ1as   and 
accounting for (1) leads to: 









)ee(w
)ee(w app
]ep[)p,p(
LtHt
LtHtLtHt2
LtLtLtHtLt , (2a) 









)]ee(w
)ee)(a1(wpp
]ep[)p,p(
LtHt
LtHtHtLt2
HtHtLtHtHt . (2b) 
                                                 
8 Our assumption of variable costs increasing in energy efficiency implies that a higher degree of 
efficiency requires more expensive inputs like, e.g., skilled labour and raw materials. An alternative 
way of modelling would be to assume fixed costs increasing in energy efficiency; in this case the 
main burden of efficiency improvements is caused by R&D activities (see Motta 1993). However, in 
our model we focus on improvements in energy efficiency stemming from incremental innovations 
which usually entail increases in variable costs. 
9 In the reference case without regulation in Section 3 firms simultaneously decide on efficiency as 
usual in most models on MQS. In contrast, under the dynamic standard in Section 4 firm H attains 
the role of a leader in the efficiency game. 
10 For the unregulated (i.e., static) case, apart from differences in notation and the use of a quadratic 
instead of a general cost function, the formal structure of our model is almost completely identical 
with Crampes and Hollander (1995, pp.73-75).  
11 In principle, due to the static nature of the unregulated case, the time index “t” could be suppressed 
in this Section. However, since we need some of the following equations also in the dynamic analy-
sis in Section 4, we refrain from suppressing t. 
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From the first order conditions 0p/ jtjt   we obtain the respective reaction functions 
which can be solved for the optimal prices depending on ejt: 
)]ee2()ee)(a1(w[
3
1
)e,e(p 2Ht
2
LtLtHtHtLtLt  , (3a) 
)]e2e()ee)(a2(w[
3
1
)e,e(p 2Ht
2
LtLtHtHtLtHt  . (3b) 
Inserting (3a) and (3b) into (2a) and (2b) yields the reduced profit functions to be used in the 
efficiency game in the first stage: 
w9
)]ee()a1(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
LtHtLtHt
HtLtLt

 , (4a) 
w9
)]ee()a2(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
LtHtLtHt
HtLtHt

 . (4b) 
The first order conditions 0e/)e,e( jtHtLtjt   lead to the following reaction functions:12 



3
e)1a(w
)e(e HtHtLt , (5a) 



3
e)a2(w
)e(e LtLtHt . (5b) 
Solving these reaction functions results in the optimal levels of the durables’ energy efficien-
cy:13 )1a4()8/w(eoLt   and )5a4()8/w(e
o
Ht  .
14 The implications of this result are 
obvious: Everything else equal the energy efficiency is the higher, 1) the higher the energy 
price w is, 2) the lower the cost parameter γ is, and 3) the higher the average weight that 
consumers assign to energy costs is (given by a+1/2).  
However, since negative values for energy efficiency are ruled out,15 oLte  and 
o
Hte  represent 
the equilibrium only under the assumption 25.0a  which guarantees an interior solution. In 
contrast, for 25.0a  our model leads to a corner solution where firm L always chooses 
0e~oLt   and firm H chooses )a2()3/w(e
~o
Ht   according to (5b).  
                                                 
12 For both firms there exists a second solution to 0e/)e,e( jtHtLtjt   which, however, is irrelevant 
because it leads to zero profits. 
13 In the following, we indicate the unregulated equilibrium by the superscript „o ” and the regulated 
equilibrium in Section 4 by the superscript „* ”.  
14 Inserting oLte  and 
o
Hte  into the second derivatives 
2
jtLtjt
2 e/)e,e( Ht   proofs that the second order 
conditions are satisfied. Moreover, in the Appendix we show that leapfrogging can be ruled out.  
15 Due to the quadratic unit cost function, cost would be decreasing in energy efficiency for e jt<0 which 
makes no sense. For a similar argument relating to negative quality levels and quadratic unit cost 
functions see Cremer and Thisse (1994, p.616).  
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In the following we concentrate on the more interesting case of an interior solution, with 
.25.0a  Inserting ojte  into (3a) and (3b) yields the corresponding prices in equilibrium: 
)]1a2(a825[)64/w(p 2oLt   and )]5a2(a849[)64/w(p
2o
Ht  . In the next step, in-
serting ojte  and 
o
jtp  into (1) yields the position of the indifferent consumer, 5.0aˆ
o
t  , and 
the accompanying market shares are 2/1ss oHt
o
Lt  . Finally, inserting 
o
jte  into (4a) and (4b) 
yields the profits in equilibrium:  16/w3 2oHt
o
Lt .  
Concerning the latter result, it might seem paradoxical that increasing energy prices lead to 
increasing profits of firms that produce energy consuming durables. However, within the 
framework of our model, the economic explanation is straight forward: A higher energy price 
accelerates the importance of differences in energy efficiency from the viewpoint of consum-
ers. This effect relaxes price competition between the firms and increases profits (see, e.g., 
Shaked and Sutton, 1982).16  
4. Regulated Equilibrium 
In the following, we solve the model backwards starting with period t=2. In the price game in 
the second stage, energy efficiencies ej2 are already given. Consequently there is no differ-
ence compared to the unregulated case analyzed above and we can employ the reduced 
profit functions (4a) and (4b) for t=2: 
w9
)]ee()a1(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
2L2H2L2H
2H2L2L

 , (6a) 
w9
)]ee()a2(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
2L2H2L2H
2H2L2H

 . (6b) 
However, in the efficiency game in stage one, the firms have to comply with the standard 
1H2j eee  . Since the latter is a binding restriction for the low efficiency producer, we ob-
tain 1H2L ee 
 . Consequently, introducing the dynamic standard is equivalent to granting firm 
H quality leadership. Inserting 1H2L ee 
  into firm H’s reaction function (5b) for t=2 yields: 



3
e)a2(w
e 1H2H . (7) 
Hence, firm H’s optimal choice of energy efficiency in period t=2 solely depends on the effi-
ciency chosen in t=1. Next, from inserting 1H2L ee 
  as well as (7) into the reduced profit 
functions (6a) and (6b) we obtain equilibrium profits in period t=2 as a function of firm H’s de-
cision in t=1: 
                                                 
16 Of course, the above result concerning profits also depends on the assumption of inelastic demand, 
i.e., each consumer buys exactly one unit per period irrespective of the energy prices given. See 
Section 6 for a discussion of this assumption. 
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


w243
]e4)5a2(w[]e2)a2(w[
)e(
2
1H1H
1H2L , (8a) 



w243
]e2)a2(w[4
)e(
3
1H
1H2H . (8b) 
It is easy to show that .0e/)e( 1H1H2H 
  Consequently, firm H faces a trade-off: The higher 
the efficiency chosen in period t=1, the lower will be the profit in t=2. The economic reason is 
straightforward: Increasing eH1 leads to a more severe efficiency standard in t=2 thereby low-
ering the scope for product differentiation and intensifying price competition.  
We now turn to the firms’ decisions in period t=1. The reduced profit functions for this period 
are given by (4a) and (4b) for t=1: 
w9
)]ee()a1(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
1L1H1L1H
1H1L1L

 , (9a) 
w9
)]ee()a2(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
1L1H1L1H
1H1L1H

 . (9b) 
With their decision in period t=1, both firms aim at maximizing total profits which are given by 
)e()e,e(:)e,e( 1H2j1H1L1j1H1Lj
  . Discounting is neglected for simplicity. The first order 
conditions 0e/)e,e( 1j1H1Lj 
  lead to the following reaction functions: 



3
e)1a(w
)e(e 1H1H1L , (10a) 



5
e3)a2(w
)e(e 1L1L1H . (10b) 
For the low efficiency firm we obtain the same reaction function as in the unregulated case 
analyzed in Section 3 because firm L is not able to influence the second period outcome via 
the choice of eL1 (see also equation 8a). In contrast, due to the effect of eH1 on the standard 
fixed in period t=2, the reaction function of the high efficiency firm is steeper compared to the 
unregulated case. Solving the reaction functions yields the durables’ energy efficiency in the 
regulated equilibrium in t=1 for the case of an interior solution with a≥0.5: 
)1a2()4/w(e 1L 
  and )1a2()4/w(e 1H 
 .17 In contrast, for a<0.5 we obtain a corner 
solution with 0e~ 1L 
  and )a2()5/w(e~ 1H 
 . 
                                                 
17 Inserting 1Le  and 

1He  into the second derivatives 
2
1j1H1Lj
2 e/)e,e(    proofs that the second order 
conditions are satisfied. Moreover, in the Appendix we show that leapfrogging can be ruled out for 
both firms and both periods if leapfrogging is associated with positive but arbitrarily small costs 
(which seems to be pretty reasonable). 
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In the following, we again concentrate on the more interesting case of an interior solution and 
assume a>0.5. From inserting 1je  into (3a) and (3b) for t=1 we obtain the equilibrium prices 
)]1a(a1211[)48/w(p 21L 
  and )]1a(a1219[)48/w(p 21H 
 . Moreover, inserting 

1je  and 

1jp  into (1) yields the position of the indifferent consumer, a)3/1(ˆ 1 
 , which 
leads to market shares of 3/1s 1L 
  und 3/2s 1H 
 . Finally, from inserting 1je  into [9a] and 
[9b] we obtain the accompanying profits  18/w21L  and 
 9/w2 21H . 
We now turn to period t=2. Inserting 1He  into 1H2L ee 
  as well as into (7) yields the energy 
efficiency of the durables supplied: )1a2()4/w(e 2L 
  and )3a2()4/w(e 2H 
 . More-
over, following our approach for the first period we obtain equilibrium prices 2jp  of 
)]1a(a1219[)48/w(p 22L 
  and )]3a(a1235[)48/w(p 22H 
 , the position of the 
indifferent consumer at a)3/2(ˆ 2 
 , market shares of 3/2s 2L 
  and 3/1s 2H 
 , and prof-
its of  9/w2 22L  and 
 18/w22H . 
5. Comparison of Results 
Table 1 compares the results of Section 4 with those calculated for the unregulated equilibri-
um in Section 3. As can easily be verified, in period t=1 energy efficiency and prices of both 
product variants are lower compared to the unregulated case. Moreover, firm H gains in mar-
ket share and profits, whereas firm L looses. In period t=2, these results are reversed: energy 
efficiency and prices of both product variants are higher compared to the unregulated case, 
firm L gains and firm H looses.  
The economic reasons leading to the changes in energy efficiency described above are ob-
vious: In the first period, firm H reduces energy efficiency because of the detrimental effect 
on its second period profits caused by the standard provoked due to 1Hee  . This decrease 
in 1He  induces firm L also to reduce energy efficiency since both levels of efficiency are stra-
tegic complements. In the second period, firm L is forced to increase energy efficiency 2Le  
due to the standard applied, and this in turn induces firm H also to increase 2He .  
The changes in market shares and profits caused by the standard can also readily be ex-
plained: In period t=1 firm H gains due to its leadership. In period t=2 firm L gains because 
setting a standard has the same effect as granting firm L the ability to commit to a higher 
level of efficiency (see also Crampes and Hollander, 1995, p. 76). 
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 Unregulated Equilibrium 
Periods t=1,2 
Regulated Equilibrium 
Period t=1 
Regulated Equilibrium 
Period t=2 
Energy efficiency ejt 



8
)1a4(w
eoLt  



8
)5a4(w
eoHt  
o
1L1L e4
)1a2(w
e 


  
o
1H1H e4
)1a2(w
e 


  
o
2L2L e4
)1a2(w
e 


  
o
2H2H e4
)3a2(w
e 


  
Prices pjt 



64
)]1a2(a825[w
p
2
o
Lt  



64
)]5a2(a849(w
p
2
o
Ht  
o
1L
2
1L p48
)]1a(a1211[w
p 


  
o
1H
2
1H p48
)]1a(a1219(w
p 


  
o
2L
2
2L p48
)]1a(a1219[w
p 


  
o
2H
2
2H p48
)]3a(a1235(w
p 


  
Market shares sjt 2/1soLt   
2/1soHt   
o
1L1L s3/1s 
  
o
1H1H s3/2s 
  
o
2L2L s3/2s 
  
o
2L2H s3/1s 
  
Profits πjt 


16
w3 2o
Lt  


16
w3 2o
Ht  
o
1L
2
1L 18
w


  
o
1H
2
1H 9
w2


  
o
2L
2
2L 9
w2


  
o
2H
2
2H 18
w


  
Table 1: Comparison of results (interior solution). 
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In the following, we are interested in the total effects calculated over both periods. Let us 
denote the average degree of the durables’ energy efficiency weighted by periods and mar-
ket shares as eˆ , i.e.: 



2
1t
LtLtHtHt )eses(
2
1
eˆ .    (11) 
Applying the results summarized in Table 1, we obtain )1a2()4/w(eˆo   for the unregu-
lated case and the same for the regulated case: oeˆ)1a2()4/w(eˆ  . Due to the linear 
relationship between energy efficiency and energy consumption (see Section 2), this implies 
that calculated over both periods total energy consumption caused by the durables sold in 
the market does not change. Consequently, within the framework of our model, a dynamic 
standard for energy efficiency according to the Japanese Top Runner Program has no eco-
logical effect at all.  
Moreover, aggregated over both periods, firm L as well as firm H are worse off under the 
standard because the degree of product differentiation decreases in each period and price 
competition becomes tighter.18 Profits aggregated over both periods are  8/w3 2oH
o
L  
in the unregulated case and oj
2
HL 18/w5 
  in the regulated case, respectively. 
Hence, from an overall perspective of welfare, the total losses in firms’ profits are 
  36/w7)(2 2j
o
j .     
 Group G1 Group G2 Group G3 Group G4 
Position a3.0i   a5.0a3.0 i   a6.0a5.0 i   a6.0i   
Unregulated (t=1,2)  Variant L Variant L Variant H Variant H 
Regulated (t=1) Variant L Variant H Variant H Variant H 
Regulated (t=2)  Variant L Variant L Variant L Variant H 
Cost Difference ΔCk 


32
w)a813( 2
 


96
w)a7271( 2
 


96
w)1a72( 2
 


32
w)5a8( 2
 
Table 2: Consumers’ buying decisions.  
Next, we consider how consumers are affected. As shown in Table 2, consumers can be 
divided into four different groups Gk (k=1:4) according to their buying decision. The interpre-
                                                 
18 From the results in Table 1 it is easy to calculate that the degree of product differentiation amounts 
to  4/w3ee oLt
o
Ht in the unregulated case and to 
 2/wee LtHt  in the regulated case.   
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tation is straightforward: For example, consumers belonging to G2, who are characterised by 
the position a5.0a3.0 i  , always choose variant L in the unregulated case whereas in 
the regulated case they choose variant H in period t=1 and variant L in period t=2. Now, let 
us denote the actual monetary costs caused by the purchase and the use of a durable of 
variant j in period t by jtjtjt wp  .19 From this we can calculate total cost summed up 
over both periods for a representative consumer of each group denoted by kC . For example, 
concerning a consumer in group G2 we obtain for the unregulated case oLt
o
2 2C   since she 
chooses variant L in both periods, whereas the regulated case implies   2L1H2C  since 
she chooses variant H in period t=1 and variant L in t=2. In the last step, we calculate the 
difference in cost between the regulated and the unregulated regime:  k
o
kk CCC . The 
results of this calculation are shown in the last row of Table 2. A positive difference 0Ck   
indicates that the consumer under consideration is better off in the regulated case because 
his actual costs are smaller compared to the unregulated case. A negative difference 
0Ck   indicates the opposite. 
As shown in the last row of Table 2, consumers belonging to G1 and G2, that apply a weight 
below average to energy costs when deciding which durable to buy, will win or loose in terms 
of their actual cost burden depending on the magnitude of the parameter a. In contrast, con-
sumers belonging to G3 and G4 that apply a weight above average will always be better of in 
the regulated case.20   
Finally, we consider the net effect on welfare aggregated over both periods. Since total ener-
gy consumption does not change, it suffices to compare the firms’ total changes in profits, 
 , with consumers’ total changes in actual costs, denoted by C . The latter can be ob-
tained by weighting kC  with the different groups’ shares on the total unit mass of consum-
ers: )CC()6/1()CC()3/1(C 3241  . Applying the results in the last row of Table 2 
leads to  288/w89C 2 . Comparing with  36/w7 2  reveals C  such that con-
sumers’ cost savings exceed the firms’ losses in profits and total welfare increases. Conse-
quently, dynamic standards for energy efficiency according to the Japanese Top Runner 
Program do not necessarily contribute to energy savings but nevertheless they can be 
viewed as a possible measure to increase total welfare.  
                                                 
19 Note that from an overall welfare perspective, actual accruing energy costs wεjt are relevant and not 
energy costs individually perceived at the stage of buying decision, αiwεjt.  
20 Remember that we have assumed a>0.5 in order to guarantee an interior solution.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
We analyzed a simple model of dynamic energy efficiency standards in a differentiated duo-
poly with two firms producing a durable which varies in its level of energy efficiency. Demand 
is assumed to be inelastic and consumers weigh energy costs individually in the sense that 
“myopic” consumers underestimate future energy costs and “green” consumers additionally 
account for environmental damages caused by energy consumption. We found that com-
pared to the unregulated scenario the high efficiency firm has an incentive to set a lower lev-
el of energy efficiency in the first period in order to relax the standard to be introduced in the 
second period. This induces its competitor also to reduce the energy efficiency of the durable 
because both levels of efficiency are strategic complements. In the second period, the 
standard applied constitutes a binding restriction for the low efficiency firm and the energy 
efficiency of the durables supplied by both firms increases compared to the scenario without 
regulation. However, in total, energy consumption calculated over both periods does not 
change. Consequently, under the assumptions of our model, dynamic standards for energy 
efficiency have no ecological effect at all.  
Concerning the economic effects of such standards we found that the degree of product dif-
ferentiation decreases in both periods and price competition becomes tighter. As a conse-
quence, the firms’ profits calculated over both periods are also decreasing. However, con-
sumers are better of in terms of their cost burden (purchase price plus actual energy costs) 
and total welfare increases because the consumers’ cost savings exceed the firms’ losses in 
profit. Hence, within the framework of our model, dynamic energy efficiency standards do not 
contribute to energy savings but they weaken the negative impacts of imperfect competition 
on consumers’ surplus and welfare.  
Of course, a possible shortcoming of our analysis is the assumption of inelastic demand, i.e., 
each consumer buys exactly one unit per period irrespective of the purchase price and ener-
gy costs given. To what extend this assumption is realistic depends on the specific durable 
under consideration. Concerning durables that are essential in the sense that they are abso-
lutely necessary for a vast majority of consumers (like, e.g., refrigerators or heating applianc-
es), the assumption of inelastic demand seems to be justifiable on the whole. In contrast, for 
non-essential durables (like, e.g., freezer chests or mobile air conditionings) it would be more 
realistic to assume an elastic demand such that increasing costs cause consumers with a 
comparatively high weight factor i  to refrain from buying at all. In this case, it is not guaran-
teed that consumers’ surplus will increase due to the regulation of energy efficiency. Conse-
quently, it cannot be ruled out that total welfare will decrease (although everything else equal 
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a smaller number of durables sold in the market as well implies less energy consumption and 
thereby decreasing environmental costs). However, the analytical complications associated 
with incorporating the possibility of an uncovered market would go well beyond the scope of 
our paper and are therefore left to future research.  
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Appendix 
We start with leapfrogging in the unregulated case calculated in Section 3. In order to rule 
out leapfrogging by firm H we have to show, that choosing an efficiency level with eHt<eLt 
does not pay for firm H if firm L adheres to its initial position )1a4()8/w(eoLt  . For eHt<eLt 
the reduced profit function of firm H is given by:  
w9
)]ee()a1(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
LtHtHtLt
HtLtHt

 . (A.1) 
Inserting )1a4()8/w(eoLt   into (A.1) yields the leapfrogging-profits of firm H solely as a 
function of its decision on eHt:  



w4608
]e8)7a4(w][e8)1a4(w[
)e(ˆ
2
HtHt
HtHt . (A.2) 
From the first order condition 0e/)e(ˆ HtHtHt   we obtain the optimal leapfrogging-strategy 
of firm H in the unregulated case: )3a4()8/w(eˆoHt  . Inserting 
o
Hteˆ  into (A.2) yields the 
accompanying leapfrogging-profit  144/wˆ 2oHt . Comparing this with the equilibrium-profit 
calculated in Section 3,  16/w3 2oHt , reveals 
o
Ht
o
Htˆ  . Consequently, leapfrogging does 
not pay for firm H.21 Due to symmetry, calculating along the same lines for leapfrogging by 
firm L yields  16/w3144/wˆ 2oLt
2o
Lt . Hence, leapfrogging by firm L can also be ruled 
out. 
We now turn to the regulated case calculated in Section 4 where leapfrogging has to be con-
sidered for both periods explicitly. With leapfrogging by firm H in the first period we obtain the 
reduced profit function )e,e( 1H1L1H  by inserting the time index t=1 into (A.1). In the next step 
we replace eL1 by firm L’s initial position )1a2()4/w(e 1L 
  which leads to: 



w576
]e4)3a2(w][e4)1a2(w[
)e(ˆ
2
1H1H
1H1H . (A.3) 
The first order condition 0e/)e(ˆ 1H1H1H   yields the optimal leapfrogging-strategy of firm H 
in period t=1: )5a6()12/w(eˆ 1H 
 . Inserting into (A.3) leads to the accompanying leap-
frogging-profit   9/w2486/wˆ 21H
2
1H . Hence, leapfrogging by firm H in period t=1 
can be ruled out. Moreover, leapfrogging by H in period t=2 can also be ruled out because 
the standard ee 2j   is already binding for firm L such that 2L2H ee   is not possible. 
                                                 
21 The case of a corner solution for a<3/4 does not need to be analyzed in detail since it is obvious 
that if leapfrogging does not pay for firm H in the case of an interior solution it would put firm H in an 
worse position in case of a corner solution. This is due to firm H’s loss in flexibility in a corner solu-
tion.The same argument holds for leapfrogging leading to corner solutions in the regulated case to 
be considered below. 
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Next, we consider leapfrogging by firm L. In period t=1, firm L’s reduced profit function for the 
case eL1>eH1 is given by: 
w9
)]ee()a2(w)[ee(
)e,e(
2
1L1H1H1L
1H1L1L

 . (A.4) 
Replacing eH1 by firm H’s initial position )1a2()4/w(e 1H 
  yields the leapfrogging-profits 
of firm L depending on its decision on eL1: 



w576
]e4)a27(w)][1a2(we4[
)e(ˆ
2
1L1L
1L1L . (A.5) 
From the first order condition 0e/)e(ˆ 1L1L1L   we obtain the optimal leapfrogging-strategy 
of firm L in period t=1 with )3a2()4/w(eˆ 1L 
 . Inserting this result into (A.5) yields the 
profit   1L
2
1L 486/wˆ . Consequently, in period t=1 firm L would earn the same profit 
with leapfrogging as well as without it. However, this calculation does not account for possi-
ble costs associated with leapfrogging by firm L: If a firm hitherto known as a cheap low effi-
ciency producer tries to penetrate the high efficiency segment of the market, it will most likely 
be forced to change its marketing strategies and distribution channels. Hence, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that leapfrogging by Firm L will lead to additional fixed costs. Although we 
are not able to quantify these costs, from it   1L1Lˆ  is obvious that even assuming an arbi-
trarily small amount of additional costs suffices to rule leapfrogging by firm L in period t=1.  
Finally, we consider leapfrogging by firm L in period t=2. For this case, the reduced profit 
function )e,e( 2H2L2L can easily be obtained by changing the time index in (A.4) from t=1 to 
t=2. Next, replacing eH2 by )3a2()4/w(e 2H 
  yields: 



w576
]e4)a25(w)][3a2(we4[
)e(ˆ
2
2L2L
2L2L . (A.6) 
The first order condition 0e/)e(ˆ 2L2L2L   yields )11a6()12/w(eˆ 2L 
 . Inserting 2Leˆ  
into (A.6) leads to   9/w2486/wˆ 22L
2
2L . Consequently, leapfrogging by firm L in 
period t=2 can also be ruled out.  
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